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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 960168-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Category No. 2
SERGIO SALDANA,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
ammended) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's
finding of guilty?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) . Prohibited acts B
Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally
to possess or use a controlled substance,
unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional
practice, or
as
otherwise
authorized by this subsection;
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-501(1). Presumption of innocence "Element of the offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to
be innocent until each element of the offense charged

—

against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SALDANA was charged by Information dated December 1, 1994,
alleging a violation date of December 1, 1994. SALDANA was charged
with possession of a controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana.
SALDANA appeared pro se before the court on December 14, 1994,
and requested court-appointed counsel.

The court granted the

motion giving notice of appointment of counsel to Thomas H. Means.
Evidence was heard by the court without a jury.

The court entered

a verdict of guilty to possession of marijuana.

Final judgment was

entered upon the verdict on February 26, 1996.

SALDANA filed a

Notice of Appeal on March 7, 1996.
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Honorable Ray M.
Harding Jr., Circuit Court Judge, Fourth Circuit Court, Provo City
Department, State of Utah, rendered on February 26, 1996, upon
verdict that SALDANA was guilty of possessing marijuana after trial
on October 2 6, 1995.

SALDANA appeals from such judgment and

specifically of the trial court's findings that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to find SALDANA guilty of
possessing marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(All references are to pages of the Trial Transcript, i.e., TT. 3)
The facts of this case are brief and essentially undisputed by

2

the parties. A reading of the transcript of the testimony of the
security guard found on pages 3 through 21 of the trial transcript
as well as the testimony of the police officer found on pages 21
through 27 of the trial transcript will give a complete overview of
the facts.

To comply with Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, SALDANA nevertheless sets forth the facts as
follows:
On December 1, 1994, Steven Johnson, a security guard at the
Edge Dance Club in Provo Utah, was working at the dance club. At
about midnight, he was observing the patrons in the basement dance
floor area.

He noticed the smell of marijuana and looked to find

where the smell was coming from.
"fairly crowded."

He said the dance floor was

He observed a group of five or six individuals

passing around a cigarette. He made the observations of the group
from less than ten (10) feet away.
individuals in the group.

He subsequently grabbed two

He grabbed the two individuals who he

thought were in possession of the cigarette

(TT. 6-8) .

Mr. Johnson said the dance floor where he thought he smelled
marijuana was "a somewhat dark dance floor down in the basement."
He further stated that the corner where the group was located was
an "even darker" area than the dance floor.

He testified that he

observed two individuals smoke the cigarette.

He described the

general size and shape of the cigarette as "probably two inches or
less" and "rather thin."

He was not able to give any description

to the manner in which the cigarette was burning.
3

He stated that

he made the observations for "maybe five seconds" before he grabbed
the two individuals

(TT. 9-11).

After Mr. Johnson grabbed the two individuals, one of the
individuals being SALDANA, he escorted them to the back door
upstairs from the basement. Mr. Johnson made some observations of
SALDANA at the back door.

He said that SALDANA "smelled very

strongly of Marijuana", "his eyes were bloodshot", and "he seemed
very nervous." He also had SALDANA breathe on him and he testified
that SALDANA1 S "breath smelled very much so of Marijuana."

He

described SALDANA'S eyes as "kind of glazed over, bloodshot, pupils
were dilated."

Mr. Johnson concluded from his observations that

SALDANA was under the influence of marijuana

(TT. 12-14) .

In response to the question from the prosecutor, "Where was
the cigarette that you've referred to?", Mr. Johnson responded, "It
was not on his person when I brought him to the back door."

He

testified that he and other security guards attempted to locate the
cigarette but were unsuccessful
On

(TT. 13-14).

cross-examination, Mr. Johnson

clarified

his

earlier

statement that he observed two individuals smoke the cigarette.

He

stated that he only observed one individual smoke the cigarette.
However, he thought that of the two individuals he grabbed one had
just smoked the cigarette and passed it and the other had just
received it. Mr. Johnson also testified that he found no marijuana
or paraphernalia on SALDANA

(TT. 19-20).

Mr. Johnson testified that he was familiar with marijuana. He
4

gained his familiarity with marijuana through "experiences as an
adolescent" and through his work in Salt Lake City.
that he works at a Forensic Toxicology Lab.

He testified

However, at the time

of the incident with SALDANA, Mr. Johnson had just began working at
the Toxicology Lab.

He testified that his ability to detect

marijuana on the street comes strictly from his life experiences
growing up and that his work does not help him detect marijuana on
the street.

He also testified that he was not trained to detect

marijuana on the street.

He described the smell of marijuana as

being very distinct and different from typical cigarette smoke or
from clove cigarette smoke.

He testified that he has taken some

classes at the University of Utah, prior to the incident with
SALDANA, that had helped him to know the manner in which marijuana
is used and abused

(TT. 5, 17-18).

Officer Broberg, who was one of the police officers that
responded to a call from the Edge Dance Club security guards, made
some observations of SALDANA. He testified that SALDANA1 S clothes
had "a very strong odor of Marijuana" and concluded from the
strength of the smell that SALDANA had been around burnt marijuana
recently.

He also had SALDANA breathe on him and he observed that

SALDANA1S breath had "a very strong odor of Marijuana."

He also

observed that SALDANA eyes were bloodshot and that SALDANA appeared
nervous.

However,

Officer

Broberg

testified

that

SALDANA1S

nervousness could have been caused by being in the presence of
several security guards.

Officer Broberg testified that he felt
5

that SALDANA was in possession of marijuana based on the statements
of Mr. Johnson and from his own observations of SALDANA

(TT. 22-

27) .
Officer Broberg testified that he was familiar with the smell
of marijuana and that he could differentiate the smell from other
smells.

He gained his familiarity with marijuana through officer

training and encountering marijuana weekly on his job

(TT. 24).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that SALDANA was in possession of
an illegal substance.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT SALDANA WAS IN POSSESSION OF
AN ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE
The Standard of Review.
SALDANA challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support
of the ultimate verdict.

"In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence at a bench trial, as occurred here, [the appellate court]
will not set aside the verdict unless clearly erroneous, and where
the result is against the clear weight of the evidence, or [the
appellate court] otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Ut.

1987); State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Ut. App. 1990); State v.
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Ut. 1991); State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328
6

(Ut. App. 1990); State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98 (Ut. App. 1990); and
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut. App. 1987).
Marshalling.
When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on
appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of fact were
clearly erroneous.

In order to show clear error, the appellant

must marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support the findings against an attack.

State v. Moosman, supra;

State v. Moore, 801 P.2d 732 (Ut. App. 1990).
"Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged."

State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Ut. App. 1988).

"We

will not make 'speculative leaps across . . . remaining gaps' in

I
the evidence.

Every element of the crime charged must be proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the evidence does not support those

elements, the verdict must fail."

!

State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567

(Ut. App. 1989) and State v. Strieby, supra.

"Utah Code Annotated,

§7 6-1-501 requires that each element of a criminal offense be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781

(Ut. 1991) and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Ut. App. 1991) . In
this matter, SALDANA is specifically charged with possessing a
controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana.

"Where possession of

narcotics is the jest of the offense charged, the government must
7

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance involved is
that specified in the indictment-"
(HI 1980) .

State v. Schofill, 621 P.2d 364

Therefore, if SALDANA'S conviction is to stand, the

City must have introduced some believable evidence on the identity
of the substance allegedly possessed and must have proven beyond a
reasonable doubt the identity of marijuana in SALDANA'S possession
in order to sustain the ultimate finding of guilt.
The evidence that was available to the trial court on the
issue of the identification of the substance allegedly possessed by
SALDANA is as follows: SALDANA was supposedly observed either
passing or receiving a cigarette at a dance club
lines 3-20).

(TT. page 19

The security guard, Steven Johnson, testified that he

observed the smell of marijuana and that he observed a group of
five or six individuals passing around a cigarette
lines 7-20).

(TT. page 7

He testified that he was less than ten feet away from

the group when he noticed them

(TT. page 7 line 16) . He described

the general size and shape of the cigarette as "probably two inches
or less" and "rather thin"

(TT. page 11 lines 3-4) . He testified

that as he approached the individuals the smell of marijuana became
stronger

(TT. page 8). Mr. Johnson made his observations of the

group and the cigarette for "maybe five seconds" before he grabbed
two individuals

(TT. page 11 lines 14-17) . Mr. Johnson testified

that the dance floor was in the basement and was "a somewhat dark
dance floor down in the basement" and the corner where the group
was located was "even darker"

(TT. page 9-10 lines 25; 1-2). On
8

direct examination, Mr. Johnson testified that he had observed two
individuals smoke the cigarette

(TT. page 10 line 17). On cross-

examination, Mr. Johnson•changed his testimony of observing two
individuals smoke the cigarette to just seeing one individual smoke
the cigarette

(TT. page 20 line 1-2). He was not able to give any

testimony as to the manner in which the cigarette burned

(TT. page

11 lines 7-8) .
Mr. Johnson grabbed two individuals, one of which was SALDANA,
and took them to the back door where it was better lit
9-11).

(TT. pages

Mr. Johnson testified that SALDANA "smelled very strongly

of Marijuana", "his eyes were bloodshot", and "he seemed very
nervous"

(TT. page 12 lines 9-12).

He testified that the smell of

marijuana was coming from SALDANA1 S clothing and that he had
SALDANA breathe on him and that SALDANA1 S "breath smelled very much
so of Marijuana"

(TT. page 12 lines 15-17).

He testified that the

condition of SALDANA1S eyes were "kind of glazed over, bloodshot,
pupils were dilated"

(TT. page 14 lines 18-19).

He testified that

from his observations of SALDANA he concluded that SALDANA was
under the influence of marijuana

(TT. page 14 lines 22-25).

Mr.

Johnson, along with other security guards, attempted to locate the
cigarette but were unsuccessful

(TT. pages 13-14) .

He did not

find any marijuana or paraphernalia in the possession of SALDANA
(TT. pages 20-21).
Mr. Johnson testified that he was familiar with marijuana. He
gained his familiarity with marijuana through "experiences as an
9

adolescent" and through his work in Salt Lake City.
that he works at a Forensic Toxicology Lab.

He testified

However, at the time

of the incident with SALDANA, Mr. Johnson had just began working at
the Toxicology Lab

(TT. page 5). He testified that his ability to

detect marijuana on the street comes from his life experiences
growing up and that his work does not help him detect marijuana on
the street.

He also testified that he was not trained to detect

marijuana on the street
marijuana

(TT. page 17) . He described the smell of

as being very distinct

and different

cigarette smoke or from clove cigarette smoke
23-25) .

from typical

(TT. page 5 lines

He testified that he has taken some classes at the

University of Utah, prior to the incident with SALDANA, that had
helped him to know the manner in which marijuana is used and abused
(TT. pages 17-18).
Mr. Johnson testified that the police were called and that it
took the police about five minutes to get to the dance club

(TT.

page 13). Officer Broberg testified that he made some observations
of SALDANA.

He testified that SALDANA'S clothes had "a very strong

odor of Marijuana"

(TT. page 24 line 1) .

And concluded that

because of the strength of the odor, SALDANA had been around burnt
marijuana recently

(TT. page 24 lines 17-18).

He also had SALDANA

breathe on him and he observed that SALDANA'S breath had "a very
strong odor of Marijuana"

(TT. page 24 lines 22-24) .

He also

observed that SALDANA had bloodshot eyes and appeared nervous

(TT.

page 25 lines 3-6) . Officer Broberg testified he felt SALDANA was
10
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App. 1976).

If the controlled substance can be seen and measured, we
conclude that the amount is sufficient to establish the
defendant knew it was a controlled substance. Thomas v.
State, 807 SW.2d 786 (Tx. Ct. App. 1991).
A review of the law from other jurisdictions reveals a
majority of jurisdictions hold possession of the residue
of a contraband drug, so long as the residue is capable
of being identified, is sufficient to support a
conviction for possession. State v. Robinson, 411 SE.2d
678 (S. Ca. Ct. App. 1991).
In

State

v.

Miller,

supra,

this

Court

sustained

the

identification of a controlled substance (marijuana) that had been
seized pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court had found the
substance

properly

identified

on

the

strength

of

objective

observations of a professional narcotics agent and scientific
tests.

It is not clear whether the marijuana was introduced at

trial.

In State v. Hull, 487 P.2d 1314 (Mont. 1971), the seized

controlled substance was analyzed but not introduced at trial.
Instead, the results of the analysis were introduced by the
chemist.

That court ruled, ff[w]e are aware of no requirement that

the alleged dangerous drug must be introduced at the trial."
Corry

v.

State,

543

P.2d

565

(Okl.

Ct.

App.

1975),

In
the

identification of marijuana was upheld on the testimony of the
sheriff who seized the substance and identified it based on his
police training on the subject and experience with the substance in
the course of police investigations.

No chemical analysis was

performed in this case.
Utah

has

little

case

law

on

identification of a controlled substance.
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1976); United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1263 (4th Cir.),
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974).

In Dolan, the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals set out six (6) factors that may be included in
sufficient circumstantial proof of the identity of a controlled
substance: (a) evidence of the physical appearance of the substance
involved, (b) evidence that the substance produced the expected
effects when sampled by someone familiar with the elicit drug, (c)
evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the
elicit drug, (d) testimony that a high price was paid in cash for
the

substance,

(e) evidence

that

transactions

involving

the

substance were carried out in secrecy or deviousness, and (f)
evidence that the substance was called by the name of the illegal
narcotic by the defendant or others in his presence. Id. at 1221;
See also, United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1984).
In Spotts, this Court adopted the six-factor test of Dolan.
Id. at 442. This Court found the six-factor test was not intended
to be an exhaustive list. Id. at 442. This Court also found that
circumstantial evidence did not require the proof of all six
factors to be substantial enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Id. at 442. However, this court recognized the limitations

of circumstantial evidence.

This court stated in Spotts:

We note, however, that this case approaches the outer
limit of what we would affirm for a possession case where
the substance itself or chemical test data was not
produced. We emphasize that this case involved not only
the substancefs smell, but also simultaneous observation
14

of the smoke exiting oeienuaiitf s inoiitl 1 ai i< 1 pi ioi:
observation of the act of taking "hits" from a "joint."
Also, defendant made several inculpatory statements and
Officer Weinmuller was able to observe the defendant's
physical
characteristics,
aspects
of which
were
consistent with those of a person affected by marijuana.
Id. at 443.
This Court found that slicrht variants of four of the six factor?
Do Ian were met •»" Spotts and one of the six factors was cl-_-- v
met.
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possessed or distributed-"

That court reversed a conviction for

distribution of amphetamine that had been based on the testimony of
a lay person who had testified that the defendant gave her a white
flaky substance, which gave her a "tingling" feeling, and that she
had "heard" the substance was speed.

She also testified that on a

later occasion, she had asked the defendant "for some speed" and he
gave her a substance that made her feel "a little high."
substance nor analysis was introduced at trial.

No

The Washington

Court of Appeals found the lay person's opinion insufficient to
establish the identity of the substance.
Other federal circuit courts of appeals have ruled that the
identification of a controlled substance can be established by
circumstantial evidence:
Illegal drugs will often be unavailable for scientific
analysis because their nature is to be consumed . . . .
To our knowledge, no court has held that scientific
identification of a substance is an absolute prerequisite
to conviction for a drug-related offense, and we too are
unwilling to announce such a rule.
In view of the
limitations that such a burden would place on
prosecutors, and in accordance with general evidentiary
principles, courts have held that the government may
establish the identity of a drug through cumulative
circumstantial evidence. United States v. Schrock, 855
F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988). See also, United States v.
Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Eakes, 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986); and United States v.
Brown, 887 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1989).
While these holdings do not specifically set out the same six (6)
factors as Dolan, those same factors are nevertheless present in
the facts of each of these cases.
16
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The government need not introduce scientific evidence to
prove the identity of a substance. As long as there is
sufficient lay testimony or circumstantial evidence from,
which a jury could find that a substance was identified
beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack: : f scient i f ic
evidence does not warrant reversal. Sanchez De Fundora,
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It did so stating:

It is not necessary that the Government have direct
• evidence to support a conviction for possession. But
where, as in this case, the Government fails to seize and
analyze the chemical composition of the alleged narcotic
substance, there must be enough circumstantial evidence
to support an inference that the defendant actually did
possess the drugs :i n question. Baggett, at 1096
I f the prosecution is i lot goii lg tic pr esent dir ect
evidence of the drug possession, its circumstantial
evidence must include some testimony linking defendant to
an
observed substance that a jury can infer to be a
narcotic. Baggett, at 1097. (Emphasis added.)
Baggettfs telephone conversations with a suspected drug.dealer
X /

had been intercepted and she had been heard to arrange for the
purchase of cocaine and heroin.
meeting

with

the

drug

dealer

Later, Baggett was observed

at

the pre-arranged

location.

However, no government witness testified to having seen a substance
that appeared to be a controlled substance, or that the substance
produced effects similar to a known controlled substance, or that
the substance was used in the same manner as an illicit drug, or
that any money was exchanged.

The government's case consisted

primarily of the secrecy of Baggett's actions in meeting with a
suspected drug dealer coupled with her having referred to cocaine
and heroin in the intercepted telephone calls in which she arranged
for the meeting.
circumstantial

The 10th Circuit found the totality of the

evidence insufficient

to support a conviction,

stating:
Courts typically require much stronger evidence before
holding it sufficient to meet the Government's burden of
proof. See, e.g., Scott, 725 F.2d at 46 (finding that
ff
[e]very fact listed in Do Ian for establishing
circumstantially the illegal character of the [substance]
possessed by the defendant was present). Baggett, at
1097.
Just as with the state cases cited above, there is a common
thread running through these federal cases in which convictions
were upheld. Although no drugs were seized or introduced at trial,
in each successful conviction, there was "an observed substance"
that was competently identified beyond a reasonable doubt by the
testimony of a witness who observed it and by application of the
six-point DoIan test or a similarly strict standard.
18
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SALDANA'S
SVL

case

rar h^ .-i st ina" ished

from

the facts

:

. ue lacts in
m

Spotts.

- , . . .^atory statements as did Spotts.

Spotts made statements that referred to illegal drugs, however, no
evidence was given against SALDANA that either he or his companion
made any reference to illegal drugs.

SALDANA was not observed by

a person who has received training on how to detect drugs on the
street as was Spotts. SALDANA1S supposed possession of an illegal
drug was observed by a security guard who had gained experience on
how to detect drugs on the street from experiences growing up.

The

police officer in Spotts actually observed smoke exit Spotts mouth
and smelled the smoke, however, the security guard that observed
SALDANA is not even sure whether SALDANA was passing or receiving
the observed cigarette.

The police officer in Spotts was able to

give testimony to the manner in which the "joint" was burning,
however, the security guard in SALDANA'S case was not able to give
any testimony as to the manner in which the cigarette was burning.
Spotts was observed in broad daylight in an empty parking lot.
However, SALDANA was observed on a "dark floor", in an "even darker
corner" with the dance floor being "fairly crowded" with people.
The police officer in Spotts was able to take time to evaluate the
situation and make a conclusion.

However, in SALDANA1 S case the

security guard had to make a quick decision and act on it.

The

security guard made his observations from about ten (10) feet away
and had five seconds to make his observations before grabbing two
individuals.

Similar

to

Spotts, SALDANA

did

not

have

any

paraphernalia that would connect him to the crime of possession.
The State needs more evidence to convict SALDANA of possession
20
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-501(1)
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58-37-8

OCCUPATIONS AJro PROFESSIONS

(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation
the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the
individual;
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
required information is not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (aXvi)
shall be deposited in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
civilly liable for having submitted the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shall be funded by
appropriations from the General Fund.
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any resources within the Commerce Service
Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the
submitting drug outlet.
1995
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
witd intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of
his business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules
II through V except that he may possess such controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by
a licensed practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa)
with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is
guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of
a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
maryuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon
a second or subsequent conviction punishable under
this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to

2

Q8j

permit them to be occupied by persons unlawful]
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sSJ
stances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally u
be present where controlled substances are beh?,
used or possessed in violation of this chapter and fkf
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealed from those present; however, a person mat
not be convicted under this subsection if the evidence
shows that he did not use the substance himself or
advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any
incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled sub.
stances by the defendant may be admitted to rebut
this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe, adininiateL
or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenik
without first obtaining the consent required in Sec-;
tion 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing
in loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an
emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile
means a "child" as defined in Section 78-3a-2, and
"emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a control)ed substance in excess ci
medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user,
or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or
dispense any controlled substance to another person
knowing that the other person is using a false name,
address, or other personal information for the purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or
maryuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but
less than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third degree
felony; or
(iii) maryuana, if the maryuana is not in the form
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person previously
convicted under Subsection (2Kb), that person shall be
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided
in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with
respect to all other controlled substances not included in
Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is

177

76-1-504

CRIMINAL CODE

(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment,
r an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
pport a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that
ncluded offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such
relief is sought by the defendant.
1974
76-1-4^3. Former prosecution barring subsequent
prosecution for offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of
the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the subsequent
prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment;
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury
trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However,
termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the
termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the
termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the
trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not
attributable to the state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of
law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent
a fair trial.
1974
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in
other jurisdiction barring prosecution in
state.
ft a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one
or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this

state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those
terms are defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses.
1973
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — Circumstances.
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred
under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar collateral attack.
1973

PART 5
BURDEN OF PROOF
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the
offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense"
mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence ofjurisdiction and venue are not elements
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.
1973
76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation or proof —
When not required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or
other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution
or the defense; or
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative
defense.
1973
76-1-503. Presumption of fact.
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or
other penal statute has the following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presumption exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed
fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a presumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact.
1973
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by defendant.
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant.
1973
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